Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta FMI. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta FMI. Mostrar todas as mensagens
domingo, 19 de junho de 2011
segunda-feira, 18 de abril de 2011
DEMOCRACIA EM EXERCÍCIO IV
«Aos amiguinhos dos alemães e dos mercados»
«Portugal had strong economic performance in the 1990s and was managing its recovery from the global recession better than several other countries in Europe, but it has come under unfair and arbitrary pressure from bond traders, speculators and credit rating analysts who, for short-sighted or ideological reasons, have now managed to drive out one democratically elected administration and potentially tie the hands of the next one.
If left unregulated, these market forces threaten to eclipse the capacity of democratic governments — perhaps even America’s — to make their own choices about taxes and spending.»
A ler, obrigatoriamente: Portugal’s Unnecessary Bailout, no NY Times.»
Nota de Miguel Marujo, no Facebook.
«South Bend, Ind.
PORTUGAL’S plea for help with its debts from the International Monetary Fund and the European Union last week should be a warning to democracies everywhere.
The crisis that began with the bailouts of Greece and Ireland last year has taken an ugly turn. However, this third national request for a bailout is not really about debt. Portugal had strong economic performance in the 1990s and was managing its recovery from the global recession better than several other countries in Europe, but it has come under unfair and arbitrary pressure from bond traders, speculators and credit rating analysts who, for short-sighted or ideological reasons, have now managed to drive out one democratically elected administration and potentially tie the hands of the next one.
If left unregulated, these market forces threaten to eclipse the capacity of democratic governments — perhaps even America’s — to make their own choices about taxes and spending.
Portugal’s difficulties admittedly resemble those of Greece and Ireland: for all three countries, adoption of the euro a decade ago meant they had to cede control over their monetary policy, and a sudden increase in the risk premiums that bond markets assigned to their sovereign debt was the immediate trigger for the bailout requests.
But in Greece and Ireland the verdict of the markets reflected deep and easily identifiable economic problems. Portugal’s crisis is thoroughly different; there was not a genuine underlying crisis. The economic institutions and policies in Portugal that some financial analysts see as hopelessly flawed had achieved notable successes before this Iberian nation of 10 million was subjected to successive waves of attack by bond traders.
Market contagion and rating downgrades, starting when the magnitude of Greece’s difficulties surfaced in early 2010, have become a self-fulfilling prophecy: by raising Portugal’s borrowing costs to unsustainable levels, the rating agencies forced it to seek a bailout. The bailout has empowered those “rescuing” Portugal to push for unpopular austerity policies affecting recipients of student loans, retirement pensions, poverty relief and public salaries of all kinds.
The crisis is not of Portugal’s doing. Its accumulated debt is well below the level of nations like Italy that have not been subject to such devastating assessments. Its budget deficit is lower than that of several other European countries and has been falling quickly as a result of government efforts.
And what of the country’s growth prospects, which analysts conventionally assume to be dismal? In the first quarter of 2010, before markets pushed the interest rates on Portuguese bonds upward, the country had one of the best rates of economic recovery in the European Union. On a number of measures — industrial orders, entrepreneurial innovation, high-school achievement and export growth — Portugal has matched or even outpaced its neighbors in Southern and even Western Europe.
Why, then, has Portugal’s debt been downgraded and its economy pushed to the brink? There are two possible explanations. One is ideological skepticism of Portugal’s mixed-economy model, with its publicly supported loans to small businesses, alongside a few big state-owned companies and a robust welfare state. Market fundamentalists detest the Keynesian-style interventions in areas from Portugal’s housing policy — which averted a bubble and preserved the availability of low-cost urban rentals — to its income assistance for the poor.
A lack of historical perspective is another explanation. Portuguese living standards increased greatly in the 25 years after the democratic revolution of April 1974. In the 1990s labor productivity increased rapidly, private enterprises deepened capital investment with help from the government, and parties from both the center-right and center-left supported increases in social spending. By the century’s end the country had one of Europe’s lowest unemployment rates.»
«Portugal had strong economic performance in the 1990s and was managing its recovery from the global recession better than several other countries in Europe, but it has come under unfair and arbitrary pressure from bond traders, speculators and credit rating analysts who, for short-sighted or ideological reasons, have now managed to drive out one democratically elected administration and potentially tie the hands of the next one.
If left unregulated, these market forces threaten to eclipse the capacity of democratic governments — perhaps even America’s — to make their own choices about taxes and spending.»
A ler, obrigatoriamente: Portugal’s Unnecessary Bailout, no NY Times.»
Nota de Miguel Marujo, no Facebook.
«South Bend, Ind.
PORTUGAL’S plea for help with its debts from the International Monetary Fund and the European Union last week should be a warning to democracies everywhere.
The crisis that began with the bailouts of Greece and Ireland last year has taken an ugly turn. However, this third national request for a bailout is not really about debt. Portugal had strong economic performance in the 1990s and was managing its recovery from the global recession better than several other countries in Europe, but it has come under unfair and arbitrary pressure from bond traders, speculators and credit rating analysts who, for short-sighted or ideological reasons, have now managed to drive out one democratically elected administration and potentially tie the hands of the next one.
If left unregulated, these market forces threaten to eclipse the capacity of democratic governments — perhaps even America’s — to make their own choices about taxes and spending.
Portugal’s difficulties admittedly resemble those of Greece and Ireland: for all three countries, adoption of the euro a decade ago meant they had to cede control over their monetary policy, and a sudden increase in the risk premiums that bond markets assigned to their sovereign debt was the immediate trigger for the bailout requests.
But in Greece and Ireland the verdict of the markets reflected deep and easily identifiable economic problems. Portugal’s crisis is thoroughly different; there was not a genuine underlying crisis. The economic institutions and policies in Portugal that some financial analysts see as hopelessly flawed had achieved notable successes before this Iberian nation of 10 million was subjected to successive waves of attack by bond traders.
Market contagion and rating downgrades, starting when the magnitude of Greece’s difficulties surfaced in early 2010, have become a self-fulfilling prophecy: by raising Portugal’s borrowing costs to unsustainable levels, the rating agencies forced it to seek a bailout. The bailout has empowered those “rescuing” Portugal to push for unpopular austerity policies affecting recipients of student loans, retirement pensions, poverty relief and public salaries of all kinds.
The crisis is not of Portugal’s doing. Its accumulated debt is well below the level of nations like Italy that have not been subject to such devastating assessments. Its budget deficit is lower than that of several other European countries and has been falling quickly as a result of government efforts.
And what of the country’s growth prospects, which analysts conventionally assume to be dismal? In the first quarter of 2010, before markets pushed the interest rates on Portuguese bonds upward, the country had one of the best rates of economic recovery in the European Union. On a number of measures — industrial orders, entrepreneurial innovation, high-school achievement and export growth — Portugal has matched or even outpaced its neighbors in Southern and even Western Europe.
Why, then, has Portugal’s debt been downgraded and its economy pushed to the brink? There are two possible explanations. One is ideological skepticism of Portugal’s mixed-economy model, with its publicly supported loans to small businesses, alongside a few big state-owned companies and a robust welfare state. Market fundamentalists detest the Keynesian-style interventions in areas from Portugal’s housing policy — which averted a bubble and preserved the availability of low-cost urban rentals — to its income assistance for the poor.
A lack of historical perspective is another explanation. Portuguese living standards increased greatly in the 25 years after the democratic revolution of April 1974. In the 1990s labor productivity increased rapidly, private enterprises deepened capital investment with help from the government, and parties from both the center-right and center-left supported increases in social spending. By the century’s end the country had one of Europe’s lowest unemployment rates.»
DEMOCRACIA EM EXERCÍCIO III
«A senhora verdade... mentiu»
«A senhora verdade, a senhora que teve razão antes de tempo, a senhora que devíamos ter ouvido. Não poupam nos encómios os que dizem que Manuela Ferreira Leite é que falou verdade em 2009 na campanha e que o estúpido do eleitor português (só não é estúpido se votar em nobres neoliberais que andam aí) se deixou levar no canto socrático. Mas como se soube ontem, via Público, "para salvar Portugal de um procedimento comunitário por défices excessivos em 2003, o Governo de Durão Barroso titularizou dívidas fiscais, para receber do Citigroup, de uma só vez, a quantia de 1760 milhões de euros. Mas a ministra das Finanças Manuela Ferreira Leite nunca especificou qual seria o "preço" a pagar pelo Estado. A auditoria do Tribunal de Contas (TC) à operação de titularização, ontem divulgada, refere que, só até Fevereiro de 2010, o custo em juros e despesas de operação foi de 300 milhões de euros". [sublinhado nosso]
Ou seja: estamos a falar de alguém que omitiu a factura para as gerações futuras para não excedermos o défice naquele ano (onde é que ouvimos isto agora, não é?). Quando nos falam em "15 anos de socialismo", a expressão favorita à direita, devem estar a querer incluir a senhora verdade, no governo do comissário europeu e do seu ministro das fotocópias. Para falar verdade, MFL não hipotecou Portugal. Hipotecou a verdade. Por isso, não a apresentem como paladina de algo que ela nunca foi.»
Nota de Miguel Marujo no Facebook.
«A senhora verdade, a senhora que teve razão antes de tempo, a senhora que devíamos ter ouvido. Não poupam nos encómios os que dizem que Manuela Ferreira Leite é que falou verdade em 2009 na campanha e que o estúpido do eleitor português (só não é estúpido se votar em nobres neoliberais que andam aí) se deixou levar no canto socrático. Mas como se soube ontem, via Público, "para salvar Portugal de um procedimento comunitário por défices excessivos em 2003, o Governo de Durão Barroso titularizou dívidas fiscais, para receber do Citigroup, de uma só vez, a quantia de 1760 milhões de euros. Mas a ministra das Finanças Manuela Ferreira Leite nunca especificou qual seria o "preço" a pagar pelo Estado. A auditoria do Tribunal de Contas (TC) à operação de titularização, ontem divulgada, refere que, só até Fevereiro de 2010, o custo em juros e despesas de operação foi de 300 milhões de euros". [sublinhado nosso]
Ou seja: estamos a falar de alguém que omitiu a factura para as gerações futuras para não excedermos o défice naquele ano (onde é que ouvimos isto agora, não é?). Quando nos falam em "15 anos de socialismo", a expressão favorita à direita, devem estar a querer incluir a senhora verdade, no governo do comissário europeu e do seu ministro das fotocópias. Para falar verdade, MFL não hipotecou Portugal. Hipotecou a verdade. Por isso, não a apresentem como paladina de algo que ela nunca foi.»
Nota de Miguel Marujo no Facebook.
Subscrever:
Mensagens (Atom)